

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 KABUL 05307 151027Z

12

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 078100

R 150625Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3867

S E C R E T KABUL 5307

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, SOV, AF

SUBJ: PAK REPORT OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN TERRITORIAL DEMANDS

REF: A. STATE 192559 (NODIS); B. ISLAMABAD 7433 (NODIS).

1. SUMMARY: AGREE WITH ISLAMABAD THAT USE OF SOVIET EMBASSY IN KABUL TO THREATEN PAKISTANIS IS BIZARRE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING "HAS BEEN" CALIBRE OF RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP IN THEIR AFGHAN MISSION HERE. THREATS MAY REFLECT USSR CONCERN THAT RECENT AFGHAN INTERNAL DISTURBANCES THREATEN DAOUD REGIME AND HENCE AFFECT RUSSIAN POSITION. EMBASSY KABUL DOES NOT THINK AFGHAN ARMY POSES A THREAT TO PAKISTAN. WE WONDER WHETHER IT POSSIBLE THAT AZIZ AHMAD HAS EXAGGERATED AN INFORMAL AND LOCAL RUSSIAN WARNING TO PAKS IN ORDER TO LEND FURTHER IMPETUS TO PROGRESS ON ACQUISITION U.S. ARMS. END SUMMARY.

2. KABUL STARTLED AT STORY REGARDING SOVIET DEMARCHE TO PAKS HERE. WE WOULD NOT HAVE BELIEVED THAT SOVIETS WOULD INDULGE IN THIS KIND OF CRUDE BRINKSMANSHIP.

A. IT WOULD BE MOST UNUSUAL THAT SOVIETS WOULD DISPATCH THEIR COUNSELLOR OF EMBASSY TO TALK TO PAK CHARGE IN FIRST INSTANCE ON SUCH A CRITICAL MATTER. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE SINCE SOVIET MINISTER COUNSELLOR ALEKSANDR A. NOVOKRESHCHENOV GIVES EVERY SIGN OF BEING AN INCOMPETENT AND A NON-ENTITY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 KABUL 05307 151027Z

NOVKRESHCHENOV WAS COUNSELLOR AND CHARGE IN KABUL

FROM 1960 TO 1963, COUNSELLOR AGAIN IN KABUL FROM 1967 UNTIL ABOUT 1970. HE RETURNED TO KABUL IN 1973. NOVOKRESHCHENOV HAS ALMOST NO PERSONALITY, MUMBLES AND, IN OUR EXPERIENCE, HAS NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE TO SAY ON ANY MATTER.

B. EMBASSY ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN KABUL, NEKSANDR PUZANOV, IS THAT HE IS FORMERLY POWERFUL INDIVIDUAL WHOSE STAR REACHED ZENITH IN LAST DAYS OF STALIN REGIME. AFTER THAT HE SWITCHED TO OUTWARDLY MORE IMPOSING, BUT ACTUALLY LESS INFLUENTIAL CHAIRMANSHIP OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. HIS DECLINE SINCE THEN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN STEADY. IN SHORT, A STALINIST WHO LOST OUT UNDER KRUSHCHEV AND HAS NOT APPARENTLY STAGED A COMEBACK UNDER BREZHNEV. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT PUZANOV HAS NEITHER THE IMAGINATION, LICENSE, CLOUT OR INITIATIVE TO MAKE THE DEMARCHE DESCRIBED BY AZIZ AHMAD WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW.

C. HOWEVER, ONE POSSIBLE BASIS FOR SUCH A SOVIET DEMARCHE TO PAKS IN KABUL MAY BE SOVIET FEARS THAT AFGHAN PRESIDENT DAOUD IS IN TROUBLE AS A RESULT OF THE JULY 1975 PANJSHIR INSURGENCY (FYI - US EMBASSY KABUL DOES NOT THINK THAT DAOUD WAS SERIOUSLY THREATENED. END FYI) AND THE INTERNAL UNREST THAT THESE EVENTS SIGNIFY. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PROBABLY HAS INFORMATION -- CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED IF IT CAME FROM AFGHAN INVOLVEMENT IN THESE INCIDENTS. (EMBASSY, TOO, CONSIDERS THERE DISTINCT POSSIBILITY OF AT LEAST UNOFFICIAL PAK BLESSING FOR AFGHANS INVOLVED IN JULY PROBLEMS). SOVIETS MAY FEEL THAT MAIN ALTERNATIVE TO DAOUD IS A RIGHT-WING, RELIGIOUS REGIME WHICH THEY WOULD VIEW AS UNACCEPTABLE TO SOVIET INTERESTS. IF THE ABOVE IS CORRECT, SOVIETS COULD HAVE ORDERED PUZANOV TO PUT THE PAKS IN NOTICE THAT FURTHER MEDDLING IN AFGHANISTAN IS UNACCEPTABLE.

D. AZIZ AHMAD'S REPORT OF SOVIET COMMENTS ON DURAND LINE ARE OMINOUS SINCE ALL PREVIOUS INDICATIONS WE HAVE HERE ARE THAT SOVIETS HAVE LONG SINCE GIVEN "DE FACTO" RECOGNITION TO DURAND LINE AND LINKAGE OF THIS WITH A
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 KABUL 05307 151027Z

RUSSIAN SUGGESTION THAT PAKISTANIS RELINQUISH TERRITORY TO THE AFGHANS IS A MAJOR CHANGE OF SIGNALS.

E. IF SOVIETS HAVE FEAR FOR FUTURE OF GANDHI REGIME IN INDIA, THEN THIS CRUDE DEMARCHE MIGHT BE PART OF A SOVIET PLAN TO KEEP PAKS DISTRACTED ON AFGHAN BORDER.

3. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE AFGHAN ARMY, EVEN WITH THE

LARGE SOVIET ASSISTANCE OF RECENT YEARS, IS CAPABLE OF
POSING A VIABLE THREAT TO PAKISTAN. LACK OF COMBINED
ARMS TRAINING, INABILITY TO FORMULATE DETAILED OPERATIONS
PLANS AND POOR LOGISTICAL BACK-UP SHOULD RULE
OUT AN OFFENSIVE VENTURE OF ITS OWN. HOWEVER, COORDINATED
WITH A POSSIBLE, IF UNLIKELY ATTACK BY INDIA, GOA ARMED
FORCES COULD PLAY SOME ROLE AND WOULD, OF COURSE, TIE
DOWN SOME OF THE PAK ARMY IN THE WEST AND NORTHWEST OF
PAKISTAN.

4. WE WONDER WHETHER ISLAMABAD THINKS THERE IS ANY
POSSIBILITY THAT AZIZ AHMAD DECIDED TO PLACE THE MOST
OMINOUS AND FORMAL INTERPRETATION POSSIBLE ON WHAT MAY
HAVE BEEN HARD-LINE MUTTERINGS BY PUZANOV AND NOVOKRESHCHENOV
IN KABUL DESIGNED TO WARN THE PAKS TO KEEP THEIR HANDS OFF
DAOUD AND HIS REGIME. SUCH AN INTERPRETATION BY AHMAD
COULD BE STIMULATED, AS AMBASSADOR BYROADE POINTS OUT, BY
PAKISTANI CONCERNS OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA AND THE
SLOW PACE OF ARMS SALES NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

5. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW
AND NEW DELHI.
CURRAN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, DEMARCHE, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, THREATS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975KABUL05307
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P850106-2682, N750003-0215
From: KABUL
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750849/aaaabqwww.tel
Line Count: 138
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 75 STATE 192558, 75 ISLAMABAD 7433, 75 STATE 192559
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13 JUN 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <28 OCT 2003 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PAK REPORT OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN TERRITORIAL DEMANDS
TAGS: PFOR, PEPR, PBOR, UR, AF, PK, (AZIZ, AHMED)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006